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ABSTRACT
The location of the Apollo Launch Complex in a 
region of high lightning incidence necessitated 
that protective measures be incorporated in the 
design of the complex and its associated control 
facilities to prevent damage or interference with 
launch operations. Hazards to personnel, fuel and 
electrical or electronics systems were of parti­ 
cular concern. General Electric's High Voltage 
Laboratory, under contract to NASA, designed pro­ 
tective measures which were incorporated in the 
complex. These included control of lightning 
attachment points on the complex and provision of 
safe conduction paths to ground, control of light­ 
ning-induced voltages in umbilical systems by 
application of shielding and circuit routing cri­ 
teria, and protection of above and below ground 
instrument and power cable runs by appropriate 
shielding and grounding techniques. As a result 
of these measures being incorporated in the launch 
complex design, very few incidents of lightning 
related interference or damage have been recorded. 
The few that have occurred are associated with in­ 
complete application of the protective criteria.
INTRODUCTION
The launch facilities for the Apollo vehicles, 
being located on a flat plain in a region of high 
thunderstorm incidence, were early recognized as 
prime targets for lightning flashes. In 1962 
there was formed a lightning study team composed 
of representatives from the various NASA branches 
with the aim of assessing the hazards that light­ 
ning would present to the launch facilities and to 
the flight vehicle and to study how these hazards 
might be reduced or eliminated. In early 1963 a 
contract was signed with the General Electric 
Company's High Voltage Laboratory so that its ex­ 
pertise in the field of lightning and lightning 
protection could be brought to bear on the prob­ 
lems. The purpose of this paper is to give a re­ 
view of the hazards that lightning presented, to 
discuss how lightning protection facilities were 
incorporated into the design of the launch facili­ 
ties and to review the performance of those pro­ 
tective features.
There were three major categories of possible ef­ 
fects that lightning might produce. The first was 
the potentially catastrophic accident if lightning 
were to ignite the great quantities of propellants 
in the vicinity, either by a direct flash to a 
fueled vehicle or by a flash to the fuel storage
facilities. The second category of problems dealt 
with the remote though more personal hazards of 
electrocution of people working on the ground on 
the launch towers. The third category dealt with 
the more subtle hazards of damage to electrical 
control and guidance equipment. One can visualize 
a scenario in which lightning burns out one relay 
or transistor, and because the damage remained 
hidden, causes loss of an entire mission. Such a 
possibility was remote because of the redundant 
designs and automated checkout facilities. The 
possibility of a mission hold or scrub because of 
such burnout was however very real.
NUMBER OF LIGHTNING INCIDENTS TO BE EXPECTED
As a rough rule of thumb one might expect 0.25-0.50 
lightning flashes to each square mile of flat ter­ 
rain for each thunderstrom day. Since the iso- 
keraunic level, or the number of days during the 
year when thunder is heard, is about 75 at KSC 
one would expect 19-38 lightning flashes per year 
for each square mile or 7-15 flashes per square 
kilometer. Within the confines of the launch pad 
one would expect 4 to 8 lightning flashes per year. 
The great majority of such flashes land in places 
remote from anything connected with the launch 
facilities and would be no cause for concern. The 
tall structure or hydrogen dewars , however, would 
intercept most lightning flashes that would other­ 
wise terminate on the ground over a diameter sev­ 
eral times the height of the structure. From geo­ 
metrical considerations and past experience one 
could then predict that the number of flashes in­ 
tercepted by structures would vary with their 
height as shown of Figure 1. Thus, one might ex­ 
pect the umbilical tower to be struck 3 times per 
year, the VAB to be struck 4-5 times and the hydro­ 
gen dewar to be struck perhaps once every two years. 
Most of the flashes would occur during the summer 
months since historically 70 percent of the thun­ 
derstorm days occur during the months of June- 
September. Rather than refine the statistics fur­ 
ther for this paper suffice it to say that the 
probability of being struck was sufficiently large 
that lightning could not be ignored.
PROTECTION OF TOWERS AND VEHICLE AT LAUNCH SITE 
Interception of the Lightning Flash
The choices open to the lightning protection team 
were either to prevent lightning from occurring, to
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divert it away from places where it might cause 
damage or to make all structures immune to a di­ 
rect lightning flash. There were several concepts 
whereby electrification might be eliminated and 
so lightning prevented from developing, but few of 
them had ever been tried, let alone proven to be 
effective. Accordingly it was early decided that 
it was impractical to try to prevent lightning and 
that one could only divert lightning or live with 
it.
A number of schemes were considered whereby light­ 
ning might be diverted away from the launch pad. 
The most practical of these was to erect one or 
two guyed towers alongside the launch pad. Two 
towers each about 550 feet (165 meters) high would 
have provided the best protection. All the evi­ 
dence indicated that such towers would indeed keep 
lightning flashes from hitting the vehicle or um­ 
bilical tower while located on the launching pad. 
Such towers however could not have protected the 
vehicle while it was being transported from the 
VAB to the launch pad unless they were near the 
vehicle on their own mobile transporters. This 
would have entailed a prohibitive expense. Also 
considered were guyed balloons, which in prin­ 
ciple at least could be flown from trucks driving 
alongside the vehicle while in transit or parked 
permanently on the launch pad. These, too were 
unattractive because of their cost and because of 
the operational difficulties of keeping the bal­ 
loons in their desired positions, regardless of 
the direction of the wind.
The most practical type of protection seemed to be 
to use the umbilical tower itself to intercept the 
lightning flash and insure that no flash would 
strike the vehicle directly. This was feasible 
since the umbilical tower was sufficiently massive 
that no conceivable lightning flash would damage 
the tower itself.
The criterion used to determine whether a flash 
would terminate on an object or be diverted to 
an adjacent higher structure was the time honored 
cone of protection concept. This concept, proven 
by experience since Franklin's day, is illus­ 
trated on Figure 2. It simply states that an ob­ 
ject of height, h, will attract to itself light­ 
ning flashes and prevent nearby and lower objects 
from being hit it they lie within a cone centered 
on the taller object and having a base radius 
equal to the height of the taller object. This 
concept assumes the protecting object is a good 
conductor and not a poor conductor like a tree. 
An object just outside such a cone however is not 
completely exposed to lightning. The protective 
range of a given object extends for a radius sev­ 
eral times its height, with the degree of protec­ 
tion becoming less the further one is away from 
the protecting object. Substantial protection is 
still provided for objects inside a cone having a 
base radius twice the height of the protecting 
object. Accordingly an extension of the cone of 
protection concept was developed as shown on 
Figure 3. This stated that protection equivalent 
to a 1:1 cone would be provided an object covered 
by overlapping 2:1 cones produced by two
protecting objects.
When the concept of a 1:1 cone was applied to the 
original designs of the vehicle and the umbilical 
tower it would found that the escape rocket and a 
portion of the command module were not within a 
1:1 cone when the service structure was rolled 
away from the pad and the vehicle was ready for 
firing. Such a configuration would occur when the 
vehicle was fully fueled and probably manned. 
This would be the period when a flash to the vehi­ 
cle would cause the greatest concern. While the 
probability of the vehicle being struck was low it 
could be reduced even further by increasing the 
height of the umbilical tower. This was most 
easily done by putting a 90 foot tower atop the 
crane on the umbilical tower. Figure 4 shows the 
shielded regions with and without the tower. In­ 
cidentally this tower had to be hinged at the base 
so it could be lowered when the umbilical tower 
was taken inside the VAB.
When the mobile service structure was parked adja­ 
cent to the umbilical tower the vehicle was 
shielded even more completely.
Conduction of Current to Ground
Assuming the umbilical tower to be struck by a 
lightning flash the surge currents of 20,000 - 
200,000 amperes had to be conducted to ground and 
dissipated in the earth. In principle one could 
use an insulated conductor from the top of the 
tower in an attempt to keep the lightning currents 
out of the umbilical tower or the vehicle. In 
practice this cannot successfully be done since 
it would require a conductor insulated suffi­ 
ciently that it could withstand several million 
volts, insulation equivalent 15-30 feet of air. 
While such insulation could be provided the flow 
of current along an insulated lightning conductor 
would still induce large currents in the adjacent 
umbilical tower. Accordingly the lightning mast 
atop the umbilical tower was solidly connected to 
the crane body and the lightning current permitted 
to flow down the legs of the umbilical tower.
Not all the current however flows down the tower. 
Since the umbilical arms provide electrical paths 
between the tower and the vehicle a portion of 
the lightning current will flow to ground through 
the skin of the vehicle. The manner in which the 
current divides has been studied both by means of 
tests on small scale geometric models and by means 
of equivalent circuits. A typical pattern is shown 
on Figure 5. The significant point to observe is 
that currents of tens of thousands of amperes may 
flow across the umbilical arms onto the vehicle. 
While these currents appear large, they are, by 
virtue of short duration, easily carried by even 
very small conductors. The legs of the umbilical 
tower or the structural members of the umbilical 
arms can carry any conceivable lightning current 
with impunity. Accordingly there was no necessity 
for copper lightning conductors running the length 
of the umbilical tower and none, in fact, were used.
The lightning current thus flowed down the legs of
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the umbilical tower onto the umbilical tower plat­ 
form and from there onto the support pedestals and 
into the ground grid.
Grounding
An extensive ground grid was provided around the 
launch pad. This was formed through the use of 
buried conductors or counterpoise connected to 
driven ground rods. In general, the ground rods 
were driven sufficiently deep to achieve a one ohm 
ground resistance. Figure 6 shows some of the 
locations where ground rods and counterpoise were 
originally planned. During construction numerous 
extra ground rods were driven so that the grounding 
grid was even more extensive than shown here.
CONTROL OF TRANSIENT VOLTAGES
The changing electromagnetic fields associated 
with the flow of lightning current can induce 
dangerous transient voltages on control wiring if 
the wiring is routed incorrectly or if improper 
shielding and grounding practices are used. The 
fundamental problem is shown on Figure 7. The 
flow of current across the umbilical arm (I-j_) or 
down the legs of the tower (I2 ) produce changing 
magnetic fields (01 and 02) in the regions surroundr- 
ing the control wires. By Lenz's law these chang­ 
ing magnetic fields produce voltages
total = + ML
between the wires and the structural steel. These 
voltages divide inversely according to the circuit 
impedances at the ends of the wire, appearing in 
this case as the two line -to -ground voltages V^ and 
¥2. These could easily have amplitudes of thou- 
sans of volts. These voltages were controlled by 
providing shields on all control wiring. These 
shields took two forms;
1. All wiring exposed to the magnetic fields of 
lightning was carried in cables having an over­ 
all braided shield.
2. This overall shield was grounded, at each end , 
to the structural steel framework of the um­ 
bilical tower onto the side of the vehicle. 
This shield was not grounded to any sort of 
insulated or low noise or single point ground.
3. Cables running up the umbilical tower were 
contained in shielded cable trays.
On some previous launch towers these trays were 
placed along the outside of the tower. In such a 
location the trays themselves would carry a sub­ 
stantial part of the total lightning current and 
were also in a region where the magnetic fields 
produced by the tower current were greatest. On 
Complex 39 the cable trays were deliberately lo­ 
cated within the tower where the magnetic fields 
produced by current flowing down the tower were 
lowest .
MISCELLANEOUS LIGHTNING PROTECTION PROBLEMS 
Grounding of the Crawler while in Transit
During the time the vehicle was being moved from 
the VAB to the launch pad it was as much a target 
for lightning as it was at the launch pad. The 
vehicle itself was shielded by the umbilical tower 
and so the problems of interception of the flash 
while in transit were no different than when 
mounted at the pad. Grounding however is diffi­ 
cult to achieve. Consideration was given to vari­ 
ous types of sliding contacts between the trans­ 
porter and buried rails or buried cables. None 
of these proved to be necessary since if the light­ 
ning flash could jump several thousand feet 
through the air to the umbilical tower it could 
easily jump another few feet between the crawler 
tracks and the low resistance soil underlying the 
crushed rock upon which the crawler treads rested. 
Such an arcing contact to ground required that the 
crawler, the umbilical tower, the vehicle and all 
the checkout equipment contained in the mobile 
launcher be elevated during a strike to several 
hundred thousand volts above the potential of the 
surrounding ground. This however presented no 
hazards since none of the electronic equipment in 
either the vehicle or the launcher was connected 
to points remote from the local ground. All of 
the electrical equipment in the launcher would re­ 
main at the potential of the launcher, regardless 
of what that potential was relative to the poten­ 
tial of the nearby soil into which the lightning 
flash is discharging. Thus, as long as there were 
no circuit connections from the vehicle or launcher 
to remote points the voltages on the electrical 
equipment within the vehicle and the launcher would 
be the same regardless of how well or poorly the 
launcher itself was connected to earth. Sparking 
from the treads of the transporter was then not, 
per se, harmful.
Uncontrolled sparking however was not desired, 
mostly because there was a remote possiblity of 
sparking between the transporter and a cable tray 
system that was originally planned to be built
immediately adjacent to the crawler way. In order 
to provide a controlled sparkover path to ground 
there was provided a continuous counterpoise wire 
buried just under the ground in the center of the 
crawler way. Over this was then dragged a chain 
fastened to the crawler. In the event of a light­ 
ning flash to the umbilical tower any discharge 
from the crawler would take place from the chain 
to the counterpoise wire just below the surface of 
the ground. The purpose of the chain then was not 
to provide a low resistance ground for the crawler, 
but only to provide a controlled sparkover path 
from the crawler to the ground,
Protection of Cross Countrj: Gable Systems
A lightning flash, if it struck directly on a cable, 
could burn through the shield and inject high cur­ 
rents and voltages onto the internal signal con­ 
ductors. To prevent this all above ground cable 
trays were shielded by an overhead ground wire as 
shown on Figure 3, The supporting post for the
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ground wire was insulated from the cable trays so 
that the lightning current was carried directly to 
ground. This minimized the current flow through 
the cable trays.
Buried cable ducts were protected with either one 
or two bare copper ground cables buried about a 
foot above the cable ducts.
PERFORMANCE OF THE LIGHTNING PROTECTION SYSTEM
There have been a number of lightning flashes to 
the launch facilities at KSC, ranging from a 
stroke while the first test vehicle was being 
transferred from the VAB to the pad to five 
flashes while Apollo 15 was on the pad. None of 
the flashes terminated on the vehicle; all of them 
terminated on either the umbilical tower or the 
service structure. There were of course the two 
flashes to Apollo 12, but these occurred after the 
vehicle was in flight. There have been no in­ 
stances of fire or physical damage and no personnel 
injuries caused by any of the lightning flashes. 
There were several cases of damage to electronic 
equipment caused by the flashes associated with 
Apollo 15. This damage however all seemed to be 
associated with systems in which cable shields 
were not properly made. As mentioned earlier it 
is of prime importance that all cables exposed to 
the electromagnetic fields be fitted with overall 
shields that are continuous and are grounded at 
each end. On those systems that were damaged 
either the continuity of the overall shield had 
been broken by omission of jumpers in terminal 
boxes or the overall shield had not been grounded 
to the structural steel at each end. Equipment 
consoles identical to those damaged, but connected 
to properly made cable systems were not damaged, 
even though they were exposed to the same light­ 
ning strokes.
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 1 - Expected Flash Rate as a Function of
Height.
Figure 2 - A 1:1 Cone of Protection.
Figure 3 - Two Overlapping 2:1 Cones of Protection.
Figure 4 - Shielded Regions with and without the 
Added Lightning Mast.
Figure 5 - Manner in which Stroke Current Divides, 
Figure 6 - Launch Area Ground Rod Locations.
Figure 7 - Voltages Induced by Electromagnetic 
Fields.
Figure 8 - Lightning Protection of Cable Trays,
8-28
UJ 
CO
J___I___I___\_____I___I___I
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
STRUCTURE HEIGHT 
FIG. I - EXPECTED FLASH RATE AS A FUNCTION OF HEIGHT
PROTECTING OBJECTS
PROTECTED 
OBJECT
/s/s////////////
—————— r =2h ———————*
/////
FIG. 3 TWO OVERLAPPING 2:1 CONES OF PROTECTION
PROTECTING 
XOBJ
N
\ PROTECTED 
\OBJECT
////////////////// //////h———r= h ———4
FIG, 2 A hi CONE OF PROTECTION
115 i /
T\ CONE OF 
\ PROTECTION
5*0' /
/ /
'' /
3<
i / \
/ S \395% N
s\^ S^* v "" i•f 
/
10'
x \
V
\ 
\
\
N
i n/ri A
\ \\ \\ PAD
FIG. 4 SHIELDED REGIONS WITH AND 
WITHOUT THE ADDED LIGHT­ 
NING MAST
8-29
L STROKE
LOX
13.2 KV CABLE
DATA LINK AND HP GAS 
GROUND SYSTEM
CRAWLER ROADWAY GROUNJTSYSTEI•
.VEHICLE < /CONNECT TO FLAME 
"^CENTER < I DEFLECTOR TRACKS
NOTE'
GROUND ROD DRIVEN DEEP ENOUGH 
TO ACHIEVE A I OHM RESISTANCE
FIG. 6 - LAUNCH AREA GROUND ROD LOCATIONS
100%
14*!
28°>
347
38%,
43%
45%
46%
46%
/ V*«,«, |
/ 1
I
*
1
I
, 14%
14%
_, 6%
, 4%
) co/
,2%
,1%
1
186%
{72
166
{62
| 5T
|55
J54 \
FIG. 5 MANNER IN WHICH STROKE 
CURRENT DIVIDES
r l I ~ ~er- —«— —«— — —•
I
lO
J0'lO
•o
O--Q
V
T
\
1
FIG. 7 VOLTAGES INDUCED BY
ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS
OSHIELD WIRE
INSULATOR
METAL
SUPPORT
POSTS-cr
INSULATOR
>c
-l&I
s s s s ss4
iCABLE 
TRAYS
O
COUNTERPOISE
GROUND 
ROD
FIG. 8 LIGHTNING PROTECTION OF 
CABLE TRAYS
8-30
